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Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure
G.A. Leonards
Professor. School of Civil Engineering. Purdue University. West Lafayette. Indiana.
U.S.A.

Baldwin Hills is located in a suburb of the city of
Los Angeles about midway between the city center and the
L.A. International Airport.

.cCREST OF DAM, NORTH

80-

The reservoir was designed by the staff of the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power. It was a small
reservoir whose storage capacity was less than 900
acre-ft. and, on the average, the maximum depth of water
was 65 ft. Site investigations were started in 1939 and
continued with increasing intensity through 1947, which
included the early part of the construction period. The
reservoir location and a general site plan is shown in
FIG. 1.
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FIG. 2.

E-W Cross-section Through Axis of Main Dam
(tangent section only)

STATIONS PROJECTED FROM TANGENT

SECTION OF N. AXIS OF MAIN DAM
4+00 5+00 8+00 7+00 8+00 9+00

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

CREST QF

~

FAUI..TI

FIG. 1.

-~<;------'--?'----

Location and General Site Plan of Baldwin
Hills Reservoir
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The reservoir was fashioned out of a steep ravine
by excavation at the abutments and filling in the eroded
valleys. The main dam is at the north face of the
reservoir and has a maximum heiqht of about 200 feet.
E-W cross sections through the axis of the main dam, and
through the gate tower, are shown in FIGS. 2 and 3.
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FIG. 3.
SITE CONDITIONS

E-W Cross-section Through the Gate Tower

Oil fields adjoin the reservoir on the south and west,
and the existence of an associated subsidence bowl was
known. The Inglewood fault, an active fault that is a
branch of the San Andreas system, lies within 600 feet
of the west rim of the reservoir. Tectonic and seismic
activity associated with the Inglewood fault was well
recognized. Auxiliary faults crossed the reservoir in a

The relevant geologic stratum is the Inglewood
formation, a marine deposit of early Pleistocene age
that consists mainly of thinly bedded fine sand, silt,
and clayey silt. Some of the strata are moderately well
cemented but others are composed of loose, powdery sands
and silts extremely susceptible to erosion.
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horizontal acceleration of 0.2 g. To design, construc1
and operate a safe reservoir in an area subject to slo~
tectonic movements and seismic activity in nearby majot
faults within a zone of regional subsidence due to
pumping from adjacent oil fields, and at a site traver~
by auxiliary faults and underlain by low density~ easi l
erodible soil was, indeed, an extremely challeng1ng
assignment.

eneral N-S direction, as shown in F~G: 4. The ~ate
moved eastward from its orlgfln~i lo~atp~~~o~~aph
avoid positioning it directly over a au .
.
of fault I, exposed by excavation near the gate.tower ln
April, 1948, is shown in FIG. 5. Note the frag1le nature

~ower was

DESIGN CONCEPT
The basic design concept adopted for the reservoi 1
is illustrated in FIG. 6. The designers recognized th;
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FIG. 4. Location of Auxiliary Faults
TYPICAL I£CTION

THROUGH LUtiNG

RESERVOIR LINING

FIG. 6. Main Features of Reservoir Lining
the security of the reservoir was critically dependen1
preventing water from seeping into the foundation soil
The main line of defense was a 10ft. thick clay linir
(tapering to 5 ft. at the top of the embankment slope~
To maintain flexibility, the clay was compacted to 92
percent of the standard Proctor maximum density at a ~
content 5.5 percent wet of optimum. As a second line
defense, a 1/4 in. asphalt membrane was sprayed on thE
subgrade soils in two coats. An open weave cotton fat
was placed between the asphalt coatings at points of
stress concentration. No effort was spared to constrl
a membrane as free of defects as possible and all opet
tions were inspected with special thoroughness.
A 4 in . cemented pea gravel drain was constructec
between the clay lining and the asphalt membrane to
collect any seepage through the lining and convey it 1
central observation and measuring station, called the
drainage inspection chamber (FIG. 4).
A separate foundation drainage system was provid1
A 12-inch vitrified clay tile pipe with open joints,
whose upper half was covered with cemented pea gravel
was installed to drain the main dam. The drain passe•
through successive manholes where seepage could be ob·
served. Markers were placed at regular intervals alo1
the drain to monitor settlements (FIG. 7) . Each of tl
smaller embankments enclosing the reservoir had simil,
foundation drains (FIG. 8). Wherever local seepage z,
were encountered, vertical or horizontal drain holes 1
drilled and filled with sand. These local drains we~
connected to the foundation drain system with 4 in. c
tile pipe (FIG. 8).

FIG. 5. Photograph of Auxiliary Fault I
of the soil along the planes of weakness. The consensus
of opinion was that the auxiliary faults were not active,
although the Department's geologist reported apparently
fresh slickensides along the structural weakness planes
(Wilson, 1949). Because the reservoir was in an active
seismic zone, the embankments were designed to resist a
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contract in April 1951. Except for a small slide along
a clay seam that occurred during excavation of the east
abutment, which was readily stabilized, no unexpected conditions were encountered. Although the designers were
confident of the dam's safety -- and a Consulting Board
concurred in this judgment -- additional monitoring systems were installed to warn of any impending danger.
These included surface monuments for settlement measurements at 50 ft. intervals along the crest, and bench
marks to measure settlement of the gate tower and of the
inlet and outlet tunnels. Later, as the need arose,
strain gages to monitor separation of construction joints
in the parapet wall and of cracks that developed in the
drainage inspection chamber, as well as piezometers,
inclinometers, and seismoscopes, were also installed.
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When put into service in 1951, the dam was considered a model of engineering excellence -- in design,
construction methods, and monitoring systems. It was
kept under close surveillance for 12 years. At 11:15 a.m.
on Dec. 14, 1963 the caretaker heard a faint sound of
running water emanating from the spillway discharge pipe.
By 11:30 a.m. he had determined that the N.E. and S.E .
toe drains, and the fault drain, were discharging muddy
water in the inspection chamber like "fire hoses", and
at 11:35 a.m. he sounded the alarm by telephone. At
12:20 p.m. measures to drain the reservoir were implemented; at 1:30 p.m., when sandbagging of a hole that
developed in the north embankment slope proved futile,
heroic evacuation measures were initiated. Five lives
were lost, and the insurance carriers promptly paid off
$12,000,000 dollars in damages. Law suits were then
initiated to recover the losses.
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INVESTIGATIONS OF THE FAILURE

FIG. 8.

A number of independent investigations were initiated immediately after the failure. However, the only
readily available published report to be issued was prepared by a Board of Inquiry appointed by the State of
California, and chaired by Robert Jansen (State of
California, 1964). A Consulting Board chaired by J. Barry
Cooke recorded their agreement with the findings in this
report, which remains the primary source of information
on the design, operation, surveillance, and post-failure
investigations of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir. Additional valuable information and analyses were published in
the Proceedings of the Purdue Conference by Leps (1972),
and by Casagrande, Wilson and Schwantes (1972), following
the settlement of lawsuits out of court in 1970. In
briefest summary, the conclusions of the State Board of
Inquiry were:

Plan of Foundation and Reservoir Drainage
Systems

Additional tile drains at the toes of the reservoir
slopes, and a special fault drain were installed and fed
directly into the drainage inspection chamber. Thus,
leakage from separate segments of the reservoir underdrainage system, and from the toes of the reservoir
slopes, could be measured independently.

I. " ... that earth movement occurred at the
Baldwin Hills Reservoir on December 14, 1963, following long-term development of stress and displacement in the foundation. The movement was
apparently not seismic, but it did take place at
faults which were planes of foundation weaknesses.
Progressively increasing displacement finally resulted in rupture of the reservoir lining and
consequent entry of water under pressure into the
faulted foundation. Erosion of the foundation
proceeded rapidly, causing uncontrolled leakage
which led to total failure."
II. "The earth movement which triggered the
reservoir failure evidently was caused primarily
by subsidence which had been observed in the vicinity for many years. Apparently the stage for
destruction of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir was being set even before conception of the facility."

The main design concept was to control leakage with
the clay liner. Normal seepage through the lining would
be collected and monitored. In the unlikely event that
a crack would develop in the lining, it was expected that
the reinforced, flexible asphaltic membrane would remain
intact. Increased seepage through the lining would be
observed in the inspection chamber and its location noted.
Ample time would be available to drain the reservoir and
effect repairs.
CONSTRUCTION
Construction was initiated by the Department's construction forces early in 1947 and was completed by
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membrane was ruptured and seepage entered into the fou
ation to begin a long-term process of progressive move
ments -- aided and abetted by regional subsidence. Th
view is supported by the settlement record of the gate
tower, crack initiation and growth in the inspection
chamber, and by the early pattern of subsidence that
developed across the reservoir floor (FIG. 11). In ad

There appears to be general agreement with conclusion I. Conclusion II was supported by Hudson and Scott
{1965) and Castle and Yerkes {1976), and strongly argued
by Leps {1972). Hamilton and Meehan (1971) related the
acceleration of crack openings in the drainage inspection
chamber, which became evident early in 1958, to fluid
injections initiated to increase the yield from the
Inglewood oil field. Subsidence and slow tectonic movements certainly contributed to the observed displacements
at the reservoir; however, in mY opinion, it is not possible to establish, quantitatively, the relative contributions of regional movements, differential compression
of the foundation strata due to reservoir loading, and
slow seepage of water from the reservoir into the underlying erodible soils. On the other hand, it is possible
to establish that events damaging to the reservoir's
security occurred so soon after it was put into service
that they could not possibly be attributed to slow regional movements. For example, during first filling of
the reservoir in April of 1951, leakage was observed to
increase dramatically in the foundation drains adjacent
to the faults (FIG. 9). The reservoir was quickly
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FIG. 9. Measured Leakage vs. Reservoir Level During
First Filling of the Reservoir (after
Casagrande, et al., 1972)

In the early years following the failure, the tri
gering mechanisms were of paramount interest because t
main concerns were with the assignment of liability.
However, the thrust of this paper is to examine the le
sons to be learned from the ensuing disaster. Thus fa
only Casagrande, et al. (1972) have published views of
the lessons learned. These are quoted as follows:

emptied. The asphaltic pavement protecting the clay lining was observed to have buckled· along the toe of the
inside slope along the east side of the reservoir. Also,
a 3/4-in. differential settlement had occurred between
the Elev. 418 channel inlet structure and the gate tower.
A~t~m~ts to seal the leaks were made by grouting in the
v1c1n1ty of the gate tower, and by replacing the roofingpaper gaskets in the joints between the inlet structure
and the gate tower with rubber gaskets.

Lesson
"The failure of the reservoir was caused by
foundation strata highly sensitive to erosion
and crossed by faults. The safety of the reservoir depended on preventing water from the reservoir entering these strata and the faults;"
"It is debatable whether a safe reservoir
could have been designed for these conditions.
Probably only a steel lining could have given
reasonable assurance of safety. Other measures
would have extended the life of the reservoir
without ensuring the degree of safety that must
be demanded of such a reservoir."

During June 1951, the reservoir was refilled. Again,
the southeast toe and fault drains immediately responded
with large flows. Subsequent attenuation of the flow
rate was interpreted to mean that the leaks were "selfsealing" (FIG. 10). Instead, it appears that the asphalt
480
470

_20

480

:i

.:

.
.

15

~

10

...

5

~

Lesson I I

450

!

200

tion, post failure investigations disclosed cavities i
the locale of fault I nearly 50 feet below the reserve
floor -- evidence of long-term seepage erosion -- whic
is supported by calcification detected on the surfaces
some of the cavities. It may be that some cavities pr
dated construction of the reservoir. In any case, col
lapse of cavities due to progressive seepage erosion a
subsidence would occur suddenly; the effect on the already weakened clay liner would be to rupture it suffi
ciently so that water could enter the foundation under
pressure. I believe that this is the most likely mech
anism that triggered the rapid demise of the reservoir
December 14, 1963.
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FIG. 11. Relative Settlement Across Reservoir Floor
in E-H Direction (total movement minus
regional subsidence, after Casagrande,
et al., 1972)
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"The observational records show that the
magnitude of these movements [subsidence, accompanied by tensile strains] was so small, including the differential settlements across
Faults I and V, that it would not harm most of
the earth dams and reservoir with which the
authors are familiar."
"The authors seriously question whether any
important dam and reservoir should be permitted
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FIG. 10. Seepage Into Reservoir Underdrains
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to be constructed if it cannot withstand with
perfect safety movements of such magnitude [i.e.,
those due to regional subsidence]. This may well
be the principal lesson to be learned from this
case record."

REVIEW OF SURVEILLANCE MEASUREMENTS
It is pertinent to review the results of the surveillance program-- a 13-year record of measurements
carefully taken, faithfully plotted, and regularly examined. In hindsight, and in the light of current knowledge,
should the alarm have been raised and the reservoir
drained before December 1963? Space limitations permit
review only of a few key results. Settlements along the
12-inch foundation underdrain are shown in FIG. 12.

In the past two decades, and especially since
rerzaghi's "observational method" was so eloquently.articulated by Peck (1969), monitoring the performance of
structures has become part and parcel of geotechnical engineering design. The approach is by no means new, as it
was practiced some 800 years ago by the builders of the
Tower of Pisa more boldly than most engineers would be
willing to espouse today (Leonards, 1979). Among the
essential features for success of the observational method,
clearly delineated by Peck, is the necessity that the
observations provide sufficient warning in time to prevent failure from occurring. This implies prior determination of a course of action whenever the measurements
reach pre-determined critical values. The designers of
Baldwin Hills were aware of all the hazards to safety
posed by the site: they knew that the soils were highly
erodible, and that it was crucial to prevent seepage from
the reservoir from entering the foundation soils; they
were aware of the ongoing ground movements, although some
would argue they may not have appreciated fully the danger that was posed; and they not only knew of the faults
crossing the reservoir but had the opportunity to observe
the fragile nature of fault I, which was exposed during
the early stages of construction (Fig. 5). They provided
two lines of defense: (1) a 10ft. thick clay lining
specially constructed to possess considerable flexibility,
and (2) an underlying cloth-reinforced asphalt membrane
to protect the erodible foundation in the event the lining was ruptured. A comprehensive monitoring system was
established to warn of impending danger, including settlements of the foundation drain under the main dam, the
crest of the dam, the gate tower, and the surrounding area.
Later on, piezometers, inclinometers and seismoscopes
were added, and provisions were made to measure separation of construction joints on the parapet wall and of
cracks that developed in the drainage inspection chamber.
However, prime reliance was placed on a compartmentalized
underdrain system to measure, independently, seepage from
separate segments of the reservoir and its foundation. A
rigorous surveillance regimen was established and faithfully executed, as follows:
Daily:
Monthly:

Annual:

HEIGHT OF FILL ABOVE DRAIN
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FIG. 12. Settlement Along 12-inch Foundation
Underdrain
Settlement vs. fill height at any given time are reasonably
regular. The settlement vs. time under 155 ft. of fill
shows that the time dependent settlements are nearly double the immediate settlement. One might ask whether this
should be expected if no water was seeping into the
foundation, but this is easy to do in hindsight. At the
time, the regular settlement pattern, and their monotonic
attentuation with time, was apparently taken to be normal.
I was unable to obtain tabulations of the monthly
crest settlement measurements. However, the crest settlement patterns published in the State of California Report
(1964) are shown in FIG. 13. The sharp curvatures displayed are due to the distorted scales that were adopted;
the patterns themselves reveal, positively, only the

- Seepage from underdrain networks
- Surveys for settlement at the reservoir and of the surrounding area
- Inspection by a squad of maintenance
personnel, and review ~f the results
of all measurements, including those
from the strain gages, tiltmeters,
and seismoscopes. (The last regular
inspection was on Nov. 26, 1963).
Safety inspection by the State Dam
Safety Office. (The last inspection
was on April 3, 1963.)

All these efforts notwithstanding, the first indication of danger was at 11:15 a.m. on the day of failure,
when the caretaker on routine rounds heard a faint sound
of running water emanating from the spillway discharge
pipe. Investigation revealed that the sound was the result of discharge from the 24 in. blowoff pipe where it
joined the spillway discharge pipe. Upon verifying the
high rate of muddy discharge from the underdrains directly in the inspection chamber, the caretaker sounded the
alarm by telephone at 11:35 a.m. --too late to stem the
flow or lower the reservoir sufficiently to prevent
breaching of the dam a mere four hours later.

FIG. 13. Settlement Records of Perimeter Parapet Wall
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locations of maximum subsidence, which correspond to the
location of fault I. A plot of the maximum crest settlement vs. time is shown in FIG. 14. It appears that
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FIG. 14. Maximum Crest Settlement vs. Time
around 1957 (when fluid injection in the adjacent oil
field was underway), the rate of settlement began to
depart from the extrapolated path but, again, this is
easy to recognize in hindsight. In the absence of an
exeected settlement-time relationship, and a stated
cr1terion of unacceptable departures from the norm, the
plot - in itself - is not decisive.
The simplified procedure proposed by Leonards and
Narain (1963) was used to calculate the strain distribution along the crest and base of the dam using the measured settlement patterns (FIG. 15)**. The results,
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although approximate, are revealing. As it was not pass·
ble to obtain samples to measure the tensile strain at
cracking, it was estimated to be approximately 0.2% stra'
(Leonards and Narain, 1963). The locations at which the
calculated tensile strains exceeded the estimated crackil
strain agreed with the locations at which cracking was ol
served to occur at the crest of the dam. What is of cru·
cial importance, however, is the observation that at the
base of the dam the critical tensile cracking strain had
already been exceeded in 1957. Had it been possible to
make such calculations prior to 1963, they may have led
to more ~r~quent lowering of the reservoir and inspectio1
of the l1n1ng. In that event, the catastrophe most like'
would have been avoided.
The safety of the reservoir was crucially dependent
on the ability of the asphaltic membrane to prevent seep·
age from the reservoir from entering the highly erodible
foundation soils. An extensive monitoring system was
installed- which was very advanced for its time- in
order to provide an early alert should the compacted cla·
liner be damaged. The designers apparently expected the·
clay liner to crack first while the asphaltic membrane
remained intact; in that event, increased flow in the
underdrains would provide an alert that the clay liner
was damaged in time to lower the reservoir and effect re
p~irs.
The fatal flaw in the design was that the asphal
t1c membrane must have cracked either before or at the
s~me time that the clay liner was damaged, thereby permi
t1ng seepage to enter the foundation soils and begin the
process that ultimately led to the demise of the reservo
As described in the preceding paragraphs, the timesettlement records along the 12-inch foundation underdra
and of the parapet wall, gave clues to impending disaste
but these are clearly apparent only with the benefit of
hindsight. Comparison of calculated strains in the emb~nkment with expected cracking strains would have proVlded an early alert that cracking had developed in the
lin!ng, but the ~nalysis needed for this purpose became
ava1lable only n1ne months before the failure. Consider
the crucial nature of the integrity of the asphaltic mem
brane, instrumentation that could directly detect damage
to the membrane was needed, but this would have been ver
difficult to accomplish under the prevailing circumstanc
The lessons to be learned from these experiences ar
summarized below.
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I. A MONITORING SYSTEM INTENDED TO WARN
OF IMPENDING DANGER MUST BE OF SUCH A NATURE,
AND BE SO LOCATED, THAT THE CRITICAL FACTORS
CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE ARE BEING SENSED.
THIS IMPLIES FULL APPRECIATION OF THE PHYSICAL
FACTORS INVOLVED -- AN APPRECIATION THAT IS NOT
ALWAYS EASY TO COME BY.

__L

II. A MONITORING SYSTEM THAT FAILS TO
WARN OF IMPENDING DANGER IN TIME TO AVOID FAILURE CAN BE WORSE THAN NO SYSTEM AT ALL: IT
TENDS TO INSTILL FALSE CONFIDENCE, AND ~~AY DELAY CAREFUL INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS.
FIG. 15. Strain Distribution Along the Crest of
the Main Dam

III. TO BE SUCCESSFUL, A SUITABLE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK MUST BE AVAILABLE TO INTERPRET
THE MEASUREMENTS. ACCEPTABLE LIMITS TO MEASURED VALUES MUST BE PREDETERMINED, AND A
DECISIVE PLAN OF ACTION AGREED UPON, IN THE
EVENT THAT LIMITING VALUES ARE EXCEEDED.

**The calculations were performed by Sunil Sharma,
Graduate Assistant, Purdue University.
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IV. IN SPITE OF OTHER SIMILAR INCIDENTS,
e.g. VAJONT DAM AND BAKER POWERHOUSE SLIDES,
I-95 AND KING'S LYNN TEST EMBANKMENTS (LEONARDS,
1982), THESE LESSONS ARE APPARENTLY NOT WIDELY
APPRECIATED EVEN TODAY -- AS EVIDENCED BY THE
UNEXPECTED CATASTROPHIC SLIDE (148 LIVES LOST)
AT THE GUAVIO HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT NEAR BOGOTA,
IN JULY 1983, AND OF THE SUDDEN LARGE SLIP OF
THE UPSTREAM SLOPE OF THE CARSINGTON RESERVOIR,
IN ENGLAND, IN JUNE OF 1984.

unreinforced asphalt membrane, the drains would have
access to full reservoir head and larqe flows would immediately be detected in the drainage-inspection chamber.
Shut-off valves in the inspection chamber would close
automatically to prevent water from flowing at high velocities in the discharge lines. It would be a simple
matter to lower the reservoir and effect repairs. It is
likely that the underlying reinforced asphalt membrane
would remain intact, hence only the upper asphalt membrane
(which is readily accessible) would need to be repaired.
However, even if the reinforced asphalt membrane and the
underlying clay blanket also cracked, the reservoir could
be lowered long before significant damage to the foundation could occur because, in the absence of collapse in
the foundation soils, the cracked clay blanket would
prevent water under pressure from entering the foundation.
Repairs would be less convenient but not overly expensive.
There would never be any concern that slow insidious
seepage could cause sudden collapses of sufficient magnitude to permit water under pressure to erode the foundation soils.

V. SUITABLE BASES TO INTERPRET IN ADVANCE
WHEN THERE IS DANGER OF IMPENDING FAILURE ARE
STILL LACKING IN THE CASE OF MANY TYPES OF GEOTECHNICAL STABILITY PROBLEMS. MORE RESEARCH
ALONG THESE LINES IS BADLY NEEDED.
EPILOGUE
Could a safe and economical reservoir have been
lt at the Baldwin Hills site? I believe the answer
YES, provided the following prerequisites were
isfied:
1.

The monitoring system must provide a
positive indication that seepage through
the impervious asphalt membrane had commenced before significant erosion of the
foundation soils could occur; and

2.

The asphalt membranes must be accessible for ready repair.
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